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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
Appellant Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. [hereafter "Citicorp"], was Plaintiff, and Appellee
Wayne E. Hardy [hereafter "Hardy"] was Defendant in an action brought to recover an
alleged deficiency owed Citicorp by Hardy following a Trustee's Sale of property securing
Hardy's note to Citicorp.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)0") (1987 Rep. Vol. 9, 1953, as amended).
NATURE OF THE APPEAL
Citicorp appeals from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, Civil No. 890904015PR, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, denying its motion for
entry of judgment and dismissing its Complaint against Hardy.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. No Responsive Pleading Issue Dismissed. The first issue raised by Citicorp1, by
stipulation of the parties and order of this Court, has been dismissed.
20 Dismissal of Complaint.

Did the District Court properly dismiss Citicorp's

Complaint as untimely filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1990 Rep.Vol. 6A, 1953,
as amended), when that action was commenced more than three months following the
Trustee's Sale and more than 30 days following dismissal of Hardy's bankruptcy petition?
3. Attorney's Fees. Is Hardy entitled to be awarded his attorney's fees and costs
incurred in defending this action, including this Appeal
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
11 U.S.C.A. §108(c) (West 1979):
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy
law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes
a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a

1

The propriety of the District Court's dismissal of the action when no responsive
pleading had been filed
Page 1

bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with
respect to which such individual is protected under section 1201 or 1301 of
this title, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the
petition, then such period does not expire until the later of-(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of termination or expiration of the stay under
section 362, 922, 1201 or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect
to such claim.
UCA §57-1-32:
57-1-32.

Sale of trust property by trustee - Action to recover balance due
upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security.

At any time within three months after any sale of property under a
trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover
the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as
security, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of
the indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which
such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the
date of sale of the property sold. The court many not render judgment for
more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest,
costs and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceed the
fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this
section.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Citicorp filed its Complaint against Hardy on June 27, 1989, some 43 days after the
Bankruptcy Court of Utah denied Hardy's Discharge under his Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing,
and some 272 days after a Trustee's Sale of the property securing Hardy's indebtedness to
Citicorp.

Hardy was finally served with process on April 16, 1990.

Through a

misunderstanding between counsel, no Answer or other responsive pleading was filed, and
Citicorp filed a Notice of Default and sought default judgment. On December 18, 1990,
Judge Rigtrup in a Memorandum Decision, denied Citicorp's Motion for Entry of Default
Page 2

Judgment and, based upon UCA §57-1-32, dismissed its Complaint against Hardy. Citicorp
timely filed the instant Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As evidenced by Attachment A to Appellant's Brief2, on September 26, 1985, Hardy
borrowed $89,300 from Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation [hereafter "RichardsWoodbury"] and secured his Promissory Note with a Trust Deed on property located in Salt
Lake County, Utah. Thereafter, that Note and Trust Deed were assigned to Citicorp. On
August 5,1987, Hardy filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Citicorp sought relief
from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C.A. §362 (West 1979), which relief was granted on May
4, 1988. Citicorp, Ex. B. Citicorp thereafter filed Notice of Default on May 27, 1988, and
a Trustee's Sale was held on September 28, 1988, wherein Citicorp purchased the property
for $41,300 and received a Trustee's Deed. Citicorp, Ex. C. Thereafter, on or about
November 3, 1988, Citicorp obtained an appraisal of the property which reflected a value
of $74,900. Citicorp, Ex. D. Citicorp did not furnish a copy of that appraisal to Hardy nor
to the Trustee in Bankruptcy nor did it advise Hardy and/or the Trustee in Bankruptcy of
its intention to seek a deficiency judgment. On April 21, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court, for
reasons not related to the Citicorp obligation, granted a creditor's motion to deny Hardy
a discharge. Citicorp, Ex. E. Formal Notice of Denial of Discharge was given by the Clerk
of the Bankruptcy Court on May 15, 1989. Citicorp, Ex. D. On June 27, 1989, 43 days after
the Notice of Denial of Discharge and 272 days after sale of the property, Citicorp first
announced its intention to seek a deficiency judgment by filing its Complaint in this matter
in the District Court, and the first time Hardy became aware of that action was on April 16,
19903. As discussed above, page 1, that Complaint was ultimately dismissed and this

2

Hereafter, references to pages or exhibits in Appellant's Brief will be "Citicorp, p. _,
or Citicorp, Ex._."
3

Citicorp alleges service was accomplished on April 12,1990. Reference to Citicorp, Ex.
G, reveals that the date of service was April 16, 1990.
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Appeal ensued. Based upon the District Court's disposition of this matter, issues relating to
service of process, propriety of the procedure in the conduct of the sale of the property, and
the substantive issues of whether or not Citicorp was entitled to a deficiency judgment, are
not before this Court in this Appeal
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I
U.S.C.A. §362 stayed any action by Citicorp to collect from Hardy. The relief from
the stay allowed sale of the property but any action to recover a deficiency continued to be
stayed, although the time for filing such action continued to run. When Hardy was denied
discharge on May 15, 1989, under U.S.C.A. § 108(c), Citicorp had 30 days, or until June 14,
1989, within which period to commence its action for a deficiency. Since its Complaint was
filed June 27,1989, it was outside the 30-day period and, hence, its Complaint was untimely
filed and dismissal was proper.
Point II
Although the automatic stay prohibited Citicorp from instituting an action seeking
a deficiency judgment against Hardy, it was not prohibited from filing a Proof of Claim with
the Trustee for the claimed deficiency within three months after sale of the property. Had
it done so, Hardy, directly or through his counsel, would have been made aware of the claim
and, under recent interpretations of UCA §57-1-32, Citicorp would have, arguably, complied
with the three-month time period.
Point III
Contrary to Citicorp's assertion, public policy demands that debtors not be subject
to unknown claims for deficiencies pursuant to UCA §57-1-32. Hardy had no knowledge
that Citicorp would seek a deficiency and could not act to obtain or perpetuate evidence to
counter such claims for a deficiency. Citicorp's failure to avail itself of the opportunity to
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make its Proof of Claim known through the Bankruptcy Court should now bar its recovery.
Point IV
Under UCA §5 7-1-32 and under rules of practice in this Court, I laid) is entitled to
be awarded his attorneys fees and costs incurred herein.
ARGUMENT
Point I:

V.S.CA. §108(c)CONTROLS THE RUNNING OF TIME PERIODS WHEN
BANKRUPTCY IS INVOLVED AND PROVIDED CITICORP ONLY UNTIL
JUNE 14, 1989, TO FILE ITS COMPLAINT AGAINST HARDY FOR A
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT

A secured debt against a debtor's real property really consists of two components:
the seem eel or Ii i r en i portion which, i indei 1 1 I J S.C A §506 (West 1979), is the va iiie of
the property in the estate of the debtor, and the in personam claim against the debtor for
the portion beyond the value of the property. See, Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S.Ct.
2150 (1991); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart, et at ( In i e: i iart ), 923 R2d 1410 (1 Oil :i Cir.
1991), 21 BCD 385. The source of both the in rem and the in personam claims against the
debtor is the underlying obligation of the debtoi to the creditor, in this ease, the Hardy's
Promissory Note to Richards-Woodbury. Johnson v. Home State Bank, supra, at 2153.
Since Citicorp's claim against Hardy was based on the September 26,1985, Note, which note
clearly predates the filing of his petition undei Chapter 7, pursuant to I J S.C. < \ §362,
collection action by Citicorp was stayed. When Citicorp obtained its relief from the stay and
sold the property at a Trustee's Sale, under the reasoning of In re: Hart and Johnson v.
Home State Bank, supra, the in rem action was terminated but the in personam claim against
Hardy remained. Since the in personam claim was a pre-petition claim, enforcement of that
claim, continued to be stayed b> I J S.C A, §362

Hie Bankruptcy Court's order denying

Hardy discharge, however, operated to eliminate that stay. U.S.C.A. §362(c) provides:
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d). (e), arid (f) of this section [noil
relevant to this matter](2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section
continues until the earliest of Page 5

(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; and
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an
individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, the time a discharge
is granted or denied. [Emphasis added]
Although Hardy disagrees that Citicorp was barred from taking any action with regard to
its claim for a deficiency, he does agree that the stay under U.S.C.A. §362 prevented
Citicorp from actually filing suit against him within three months after the Trustee Sale.
UCA §57-1-32 was an "applicable law" as used in U.S.C.A. § 108(c), and that section governs
how long Citicorp had to bring its deficiency action.4 The only remaining question is
whether following the Denial of Discharge, Citicorp had three months, as provided in UCA
§57-1-32, or 30 days, as provided in U.S.C.A. §108(c), to commence its action against Hardy.
This issue has been characterized by one court as being whether the limitations period was
"suspended" [which, in this case, would afford Citicorp the three-month period] or continued
to run but was "extended" [which, in this case, would limit Citicorp to the 30 day period].
Ross Wilkey, Trustee v. Union Bank & Trust Company, et al, (In re Baird), 63 Bankr. 60
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 1986). There the Court reviewed the Congressional history of U.S.C.A.
§ 108(c) and concluded, at 63:
We hold that Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code extends a creditor's right
to bring an action through the pendency of a debtor's bankruptcy case only
for 30 days after the automatic stay expires by operation of law or is lifted by
order of court. Section 108 does not in and of itself suspend the running of
a statute of limitation. The reference in Section 108(c) to "suspension" is not
to the operation of bankruptcy law but to other, specialized "suspension"
statutes, such as the Internal Revenue Code section cited in the legislative
history. [Emphasis is the Court's]
Other courts have concurred: First American Title Co. v. Design Builders, Inc., (In re: Design
Builders, Inc., 18 Bankr. 392 (D. Idaho 1981); See, also, John Morton v. National Bank of
New York City (In re: Morton), 866 F.2d 561 (2nd Cir. 1989), 19 BCD 85, where the court

4

In this regard, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41 (1987 Rep.Vol. 9, 1953, as amended) seems
to be irrelevant since the protection it provides is built into U.S.C.A. § 108(c).
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concluded that U.S.CA. § 108(c) "tolled" the filing of an action but did not suspend the
obligation on the creditor to take such actions as required by state law to "extend, continue
or renew" its statutory lien.
While periods of limitations are clearly designed to prevent stale claims by limiting
the period of time within which one can discover, perfect and bring si ill: on a claim, si ich a
period of limitations should not be applied to bar a claim when the holder of that claim was
statutorily prevented from filing the action within the period allowed. UCA §78-12-41 and
U.S.CA. §108(c) are statutes enacted to prevent just such an inequity. Howevei , those
statutes should be applied to harmonize, as far as possible, with the limitations statute. Millet
v. Clark Clinic Corporation, filN \\2i\ ^M (l Mali I'Ml)

Since a bankruptcy filing does not

prevent discovery of the claim nor does it prevent the creditor from evaluating or otherwise
perfecting its claim, interpreting U.S.CA. §108(c) as "extending the limitations period" as
opposed to "suspending the running of the lixn itations period" provides such harmony by
providing the creditor the necessary protection that its claim will not be time barred as a
result of the bankruptcy stay; yet not defeating the purpose of the period of limitations.5
Applying such an interpretation to U.S.CA. §108(c)(l) in the context of this case, would be
illustrated by the following example: If the bankruptcy order denying Hardy a discharge
would have been .-,'*:<--

Ocir^vi

^ ;ws,\

. ,ionn> <ii:ci iiu- r.stcv* 'vile),

Citicorp would have had two months to bring its action since the period remaining under
UCA §57-1-32 exceeded the 30 days provided r v t s C A. §108(c). Such a reading is
consistent with purposes of I JCA §57-1-32 and

\ S ".v 1/ 4 i and apj-t. :.-<* cm ^>tent

with this Court's reasoning in Millet v. Clark, supra.

5

The harm in ruling otherwise is apparent when one considers that such a ruling would
apply with equal force to periods of limitation for contracts (6 years), judgments (8 years),
other actions (4 years). Considering that bankruptcy cases can be pending for many years,
the purpose of the periods of limitation could be entirely defeated.
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Point II:

CITICORP WAS NOT PREVENTED FROM PROVIDING NOTICE OF ITS
INTENTION TO SEEK A DEFICIENCY WITHIN THREE MONTHS
FOLLOWING THE TRUSTEES SALE
Under 11 U.S.C.A. §501 (West 1979), there is no restriction on when a

creditor may file a Proof of Claim. Interpreting U.S.C.A. §501, the courts have held that
while a secured creditor does not have to file a Proof of Claim with regard to the secured
portion of its debt, the creditor must file a Proof of Claim for the unsecured portion if it
wishes to recoup that portion and there may be other procedural reasons why a creditor
would wish to file a proof of claim although not mandated to do so. See, 3 Collier on
Bankruptcy 11501.01 (15th Ed. 1990), and the cases cited therein. Thus, although Hardy's
Chapter 7 filing had been deemed a "no asset" case and the filing of Proof of Claim was not
required, clearly nothing under the Bankruptcy Act prevented Citicorp from filing a Proof
of Claim for a deficiency with the Trustee. Had Citicorp done so, Hardy would have, at a
minimum, had constructive notice of the intention to seek a deficiency. Had Citicorp
followed custom and sent a copy of the proof of claim to Hardy's counsel, Hardy would
likely have had actual notice of the claim for deficiency and, hence, an opportunity to obtain
and preserve evidence to defend against such deficiency claim. In interpreting UCA §57-132, this court has placed greater emphasis on the actual notice of the creditor's intention
and less emphasis on "procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be cleared, rather than
absolute bars to suit" [Standard Federal Saving and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 161 Utah
Adv.Rep. 26 (May 17, 1991)]. Without conceding that filing such a Proof of Claim would
have justified not filing within 30 days following denial of discharge, it would have been
more analogous to the situation in that case. In this case, Hardy had no actual knowledge
of Citicorp's intention until he received service of process on April 16, 1990. Citicorp's
anticipated argument that U.S.C.A. §362 prevented or excused it from taking any action to
provide Hardy notice of its intention to claim a deficiency is not supported by the
Bankruptcy Act nor the cases. In re: Morton, supra. Citicorp was not prevented from taking
action {e.g., filing a Proof of Claim in the amount of the alleged deficiency) within the time
Paee 8

requirements of UCA §57-1-32. Denial of discharge is not uncommon and Citicorp could
reasonably have foreseen its occurrence in Hardyfs case. However, it chose to assume that
Hardy would be discharged and hence its alleged deficiency not recoverable. Citicorp, not
Hardy, should be charged with consequences of that choice and, without regard to § 108(c),
Citicorp's failure file Proof of Claim bars its claim for a deficiency and Judge Rigtrup's
dismissal of its Complaint was proper.
Point III:

PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES
DISMISSAL BE UPHELD

THAT THE DISTRICT

COURTS

The public policy issue raised in Point III of Citicorp's brief is clearly specious.
Hardy filed his Chapter 7 petition nine months before Citicorp sought relief from the stay
and over a year before the Trustee's Sale occurred. Any suggestion that the filing was done
to limit Citicorp's rights under UCA §57-1-32 is simply without merit. Of even more
importance, U.S.C.A. § 108(c) was enacted to, and does prevent exactly the harm suggested
by Citicorp. See, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, 11108.04 (15th Ed. 1991). In fact, in light of the
clear applicability of U.S.C.A. § 108(c), it is inexplicable that Citicorp does not discuss that
statute in its brief. Also, it is significant that while Citicorp complains that the trial court
did not consider UCA §78-12-41, it fails to mention or include as part of its brief, the
Court's minute entry of December 18, 1989 [Attached hereto as Exhibit A to Appellee's
Brief], wherein the Court raises, inter alia, the issue of failure to comply with UCA §57-1-32.
Citicorp also fails to include in its brief, its "Plaintiffs Response to Courts Minute Entry of
12-18-89" [attached hereto as Exhibit B to Appellee's Brief]. In that document, Citicorp fails
to discuss or even cite UCA §78-12-41, let alone the controlling statute, U.S.C.A. §108(c).
The mess Citicorp finds itself in is not due to Judge Rigtup's ruling, but from its own
failure to exercise its existing rights under law: After the Trustee's Sale, it was free to file
a Proof of Claim with the Trustee for the deficiency; after the denial of discharge, it was
afforded 30 days to file its Complaint under UCA §57-1-32. For all of these reasons, Judge
Rigtrup's dismissal should be sustained.
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Point IV:

HARDY SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
INCURRED IN DEFENDING THIS MATTER

Hardy is entitled to be awarded his attorney's fees and costs in defending this action
based both upon UCA §57-1-32 and based upon Citicorp's conduct of this case in both the
District Court and in this Court.
UCA §57-1-32 clearly provides that "the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect
its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action" under that section.
This provision has been interpreted to extend to debtors prevailing in their defense against
creditor's claims under that section. Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791
P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Beyond the provision of UCA §57-1-32, Citicorp's actions in this matter justify award
of attorney's fees. As discussed above, Citicorp did not make the District Court aware of
UCA §78-12-41, the statute it was relying upon, nor did it make the District Court aware
of U.S.C.A. § 108(c), the controlling statute in this matter. In its brief before this Court, it
did not include the District Court's 12-18-89 Minute Entry and its response thereto, nor did
it mention them, thus misleading this Court to believe that Citicorp had no opportunity to
raise the limitations issue with the District Court. In its brief before this Court, Citicorp has
not mentioned or even cited U.S.C.A. § 108(c), the controlling statute.

Thus, Hardy,

supposedly the responding party in this Appeal, has had to do all of the foundational
research on the central issues to the Appeal. That burden is typically borne by the appellant
and the Appellee responds in its brief. Citicorp has reversed the role and now has an
opportunity, which Hardy does not have, to research and reply in writing to the substantive
arguments.

After doing Citicorp's work, Hardy contacted Citicorp and, citing the

appropriate authorities in the matter, offered Citicorp an opportunity to withdraw its Appeal
without incurring any obligation to pay Hardy's attorney's fees and costs. It declined to do
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so.6

As argued above, under the clear weight of law, Citicorp's Appeal, while perhaps not

substantively frivolous, was without merit. However, procedurally, the manner in which the
issues were raised in both the District Court and in this Court was frivolous, and its conduct
justifies award of Hardy's attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Hardy urges this Court to affirm the District Court's
dismissal of Citicorp's Complaint against Hardy and to enter its order awarding Hardy his
attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending this matter and remanding the matter to the
District Court for ascertaining and imposing those fees and costs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 1991.

/S/ B. Clark-Arnold
R. CLARK ARNOLD
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant Hardy
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this July 26, 1991,1 properly served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Appellee's Brief on BRYAN ROBINSON and STEVEN D. BRANTLEY,
Shapiro & Robinson, Attorneys for Appellant Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 4516 South 700 East,
Suite 360, Murray, Utah 84107, by depositing the same in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid.

/ s / R Clark-Arnold
R. CLARK ARNOLD
6

By his signature to this brief, R. Clark Arnold certifies (i) that when the Stipulation for
Enlargement and Partial Dismissal was signed, he suggested in a telephone conversation
with Steven Brantley that, based upon the authorities cited herein, the appeal should be
dismissed; (ii) that in a subsequent telephone conversation with Bryan Robinson, Mr.
Brantley's senior partner, he made the same suggestion and discussed the alleged briefing
deficiencies and furnished most of the citations contained in this brief; and, (hi), thereafter,
Mr. Robinson,on behalf of Citicorp, specifically rejected the opportunity to withdraw this
appeal, even though Mr. Arnold specifically told him that Mr. Hardy would waive any claims
to attorney's fees and costs if the appeal were withdrawn prior to preparing this brief.
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EXHIBIT A

WL»W8T!!£TC:i,!!T
Third Judicial District

DEC 1 8 1989
S/CtfLAKS COUNTY A V V >

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT dofep

Dapuiy Cleric

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
CITICORP MORTGAGE, INC
PLAINTIFF
VS
HARDY, WAYNE E

CASE NUMBER 890904 015 PR
DATE 12/18/89
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CUG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

THIS CASE WAS ON THE COURTS' DISMISSAL CALENDAR DECEMBER
14, 1989. A LAW CLERK DELIVERED A MOTION AND ORDER FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE & BASED THEREON THE CLERK CONTINUED THE MATTER TO
THE COURTS DISMISSAL CALENDAR OF MARCH 16, 1990 AT 8:30 A.M.
THE COURT HAS CONSIDERED THE MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE AND
HAS REVIEWED THE FILE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. THE COMPLAINT
WAS FILED HEREIN ON JUNE 27, 1989. THE FILE DOES NOT CONTAIN
AN "UNABLE TO LOCATE" RETURN WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT A SUMMONS
ISSUED WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 4(B), U.R.C.P. THE COMPLAINT, AND ATTACHMENTS, SEEM TO INFER OR SUGGEST THAT A PRIVATE TRUSTEE'S SALE
WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER 28, 1988. THE DEFICIENCY ACTION HEREIN
WAS FILED JUNE 27, 1989, MORE THAN THREE MONTHS BEYOND THE
PRIVATE TRUSTEES' SALE ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1988, IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 57-1-32, U.C.A. IT APPEARS THE ACTION DOES NOT PROPERLY
LIE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION WHY ALTERNATIVE SERVICE
WOULD OR SHOULD CONFER IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION, PERMITTING THE
COURT ULTIMATELY TO ENTER A PERSONAL DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. FOR
THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE COURT HAS FILED THE ORDER FOR
ALTERNATIVE SERVICE UNSIGNED, AND WILL NOT APPROVE IT UNDER ALL
OF THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THE "ALTERNATIVE SERVICE" IS

NOT OTHERWISE JUSTIFIED WITHIN 15 DAYS, THE COURT WILL DISMISS
THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
CC:

FILE / JUDGE /
BRYAN C. ROBINSON - ATTORNEY
180 SOUTH 300 WEST, SUITE 350
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

EXHIBIT B

Bryan C Robinson, Bar #2778
Clay Harrison, Bar #5080
SHAPIRO & ROBINSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
180 South 300 West, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 364-1818
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V
AL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

IN THE THIRD

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

;i

CITICORP MORTGAGE, INC.,

i
i

Plaintiff's Response
to Court's Minute Entry
of 12/18/89

v.

I

Civil No. 890904015 PR

WAYNE E. HARDY,

i

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Bryan C Robinson,
responds to the Minute Entry of the Court dated 12/18/89, on the
above referenced-matter.

There appear to be three issues raised

by the Court in this matter:
file;

2)

1) No "Unable to Locate Return" in

Timeliness of the filing of the action; and 3) In

personam jurisdiction.

Each of these issues will be dealt with

in the order presented.
1.

No "Unable to Locate" Return. Admittedly, there is no

return in the file.

This is simply because Plaintiff has been

unable to acquire these returns until today.
office had

simply

The constable's

forgotten to send the returns, and three

requests were necessary before Plaintiff was able to procure
them.

A copy of the page of the summons stamped with time of

receipt by the Constable

is attached as Exhibit "A" and is

incorporated herein by reference.
thereon

Please note that the date

(June 29, 1989) makes it clear that the summons was

issued within the proper time.

Find also attached a copy of two

"Unable to Locate" returns made by the constable's office, which
copies are attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" and are
incorporated herein by reference.
2.

Timeliness of the Filing of the Action.

The Court is

correct in noting that the Trustee's Sale was held on September
28, 1988 and that this action was filed on June 27, 1989.
However,

there

considered

by

are

other

the Court

violation of U.C.A.

circumstances

before dismissing

57-1-32.

that

need

to

be

the action as a

Defendant had filed a Chapter 7

bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Utah on August 5, 1987.

Due to the automatic stay imposed by

3 62 of the Bankruptcy Code, Plaintiff was required to obtain a
lift of stay in order to foreclose the Property.

Lift of stay

was obtained, pursuant to that Order lifting the automatic stay,
a

copy

of

which

is

attached

incorporated herein by reference.

hereto

as

Exhibit

"D" and

The foreclosure action was

commenced and completed, all according to and pursuant to U.C.A.
57-1-23, et seq., and as declared in that copy of the Trustee's
Deed attached to Plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of said foreclosure.
The details and amounts are also stated in Plaintiff's complaint.
On or about May 17, 1989, Plaintiff received a Notice of Denial
of Discharge, as required by Rule 4006 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

A copy of this Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and is
incorporated herein by reference.
and

incorporated

herein

by

Exhibit "F" attached hereto

reference,

is

a

Bankruptcy Court Minutes relating to this matter.

copy

of

the

These minutes

state clearly that Defendant was guilty of making a false oath,
and

that

the

egregious."

nature

of

this

According to

lifts the automatic stay.

fraud

was

7/

substantial

and

362(c)(2)(c), denial of discharge

Lift of stay, together with denial of

discharge allows a creditor to pursue its remedies at law.

As

Notice was received by Plaintiff on our about May 17, and since
the

automatic

stay

prevents

the

running

of

any

statute

limitation, Plaintiff's filing of this action was timely and
should not be dismissed.
3.

In Personam Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff hereby withdraws

its motion to serve Defendant by alternative service.
admits that

it is necessary

Plaintiff

to make personal service upon

Defendant in order to obtain a personal judgment.

Plaintiff

assures the Court, however, that several new leads have turned
up, all of which will be helpful in locating the person of the
defendant.

Plaintiff also has reasonable belief that Defendant

works in Salt Lake County, and there is good reason to believe
that Defendant also resides in Salt Lake County.

Plaintiff is

given a statutory period of one year from date of filing to
locate the defendant.

The period allowed would not expire until

September 8, 1990, and Plaintiff fully intends to use each day
necessary to locate the defendant.

Wherefore, Plaintiff

prays that the Court refrain from

dismissing this action.
DATED this 29th day of December, 1989.

ryan G'Robinson
torney/for Plaintiff
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